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MacDonald: Gross Profits: A Client's Perspective

GROSS PROFITS: A CLIENT'S PERSPECTIVE
Duncan A. MacDonald'
As you will see, 25 years of working in a highly regulated industry has shaped my thinking on today's topic. I manage a legal
department that oversees the activities of almost 2,000 law firms
throughout the United States. Most of the firms are small and involved with routine collection work. However, about 15-20% of the
budget I manage goes to hire very large law firms, many recognized
as national or super-regional firms, who represent us in complex
lawsuits, legislative and regulatory matters, and policy planning issues.
On occasion, a modest portion of the "outside" budget has gone to
economists, public relations firms, trade associations, an English professor and even an historian. All of these relations are created through
tightly drawn contracts and are closely overseen by lawyers and business people. To my knowledge, none of these relationships result in
"gross" profits to the provider of the service.
Our topic today is to determine whether some law firms nonetheless make gross profits from their clients. I intend to focus on the
issue only as it relates to large law firms and clients. Yet I am not
sure what we mean by the word "gross." Does it mean excessive or
unconscionable profits or profits obtained by fraud? Or do we intend
it to mean something different, like the kind of profit that comes
when a partner charges $400-500 per hour? Answering these questions is important, because profit, even handsome profit, is not alien
to most business people-it is why they are in business. They want
to make as much as they can fairly get and they admire others who
do so as well. They recognize, in a modem application of their
Benthamite heritage, that the accumulation of wealth among as many
people as possible provides them with increased business opportunities.

* The author is house counsel with a New York financial institution. A.B., 1966, City
College of New York; J.D., Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington; LL.M., 1975,
New York University Law School. The author points out that the opinions expressed in this
Article are his own and should not be attributed to his employer. Editor's note: This speech
was part of a conference on Gross Profits organized by the Association of American Law
Schools Section on Professional Responsibility.
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As I see it, our issue is not whether law finns profits are out-ofline-it is whether both the client and the law firm are properly
managing their relationship to get the most value for the expense. If
either fails, what they get is not gross profits but gross mismanagement and misunderstanding. In fact, there is more than enough evidence of such failure involving our profession. Clients' well known
irritation with lawyers tells us something goes wrong when they get
together. I think I know what it is: hourly billing.
Let me tell you why. For 25 years or so, I have closely watched
business colleagues deal with a myriad of other service providers. I
have gotten into the thick of their deals, negotiating and drafting their
contracts, and managing some aspects of their performance. Of all
their service providers, however, business people seem to deal with
their lawyers least favorably. Why so? Are the services the lawyers
provide fundamentally different from those of other providers? Not in
my experience: what lawyers do generally parallels other professionals, except their billing. Law firm hourly billing, because it is unlike
general business billing, generates client hostility and cynicism, and
on occasion, suspicions of a swindle. Many business people contend
that it generates unnecessary work. They suspect that law firms often
exaggerate the risk in an assignment just to keep their staffs gainfully
occupied and to ensure a steady stream of profitable revenue.
Other service providers are less subject to such suspicions, even
though what they do has much in common with law firms. They
work on equally difficult problems for their clients, some of which
can even threaten the life of the business. They manage contingencies,
economic loss, client reorganizations, disputes (even certain aspects of
litigation), and legislative initiatives-in effect, almost every kind of
vexing problem a business can face. Consider, for example, what
public relations firms do for a company facing a public crisis, like an
oil spill or drug tampering incident. In the old days, the company's
first line of protection would have been to hire lawyers. Not anymore.
Smart business people nowadays get as good or better advice from
public relations ("PR") firms. The PR firm is hired not to put a spin
on things, but to provide tough advice. To counter the risk of a loss
of public faith in the client's brand or products, they advise the client
to tell the truth, to cooperate fully with public authorities, including
the media, and to spend money to rectify the situation. Among many
business people today, unfortunately, law firms would be viewed as
the last line of protection. They perceive, perhaps wrongly, that all
the law firm will tell them is to hunker down for a long, drawn out
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fight. Experience has taught them however, that this strategy too often
backfires. It can breed public suspicion, provoke legal action, and
generate unfavorable media attention against their company. The law
firm, they perceive, might benefit from an aggressive stance, but the
client probably will not.
Numerous other service providers do work that is similar to ours
and perhaps should be ours. Consultants like Kroll Associates prevent
and manage security breaches; Arthur Andersen helps beleaguered
companies weather storms of competition; investment bankers one day
aid and the next day prevent hostile takeovers; tax advisors tell both
sides how to make the best out of the ordeal; and lobbyists orchestrate political responses. Up and down the economy, economists, collection agents, total quality management ("TQM") experts and a horde
of other service agents at the beck and call of the business community serve as lawyers serve, except that they bill differently. Few, if
any of them bill hourly.
Let me try to illustrate our issue with an example that at least
will be familiar to in-house counsel. Big Company ("BC") gets hit
with a troublesome antitrust problem and contacts Prestige Law firm
("PL") for counseling. BC asks the Managing Partner if PL has an
attorney experienced with its kind of problem. The answer, except in
rare cases, is almost always yes. In fact, the partner can usually be
expected to go a step further, raving about "Mr. Antitrust" down the
hall. The specs on Mr. Antitrust are predictable: he has practiced
antitrust law for many decades, has written numerous articles on virtually every aspect of the law, has taught it in one of the top law
schools, has argued many of the more famous antitrust cases (and
won, naturally), and on and on. The clincher on Mr. Antitrust is a
yawn: "He probably knows more about antitrust than anyone around."
Unfortunately, if you make the mistake of saying you think Mr.
Antitrust can help you wrap up your problem quickly without a
whole lot of work, you discover this is not exactly true. Somehow or
other, Mr. Antitrust's genius and experience do not come with enough
to provide you with efficient, inexpensive service. In the hands of PL,
your problem immediately begins to contort. The firm tells you it
needs more facts, which you know is not the case, and that it makes
sense to have a few associates do a "little" research. In short order,
that is followed by a parade of contingency monsters-scare stories to
entice you to make PL work more. They may or may not have to
work more, for their rationale, whatever it is, is seemingly a
smokescreen. The real culprit is billing by the hour. How else is the
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firm ever going to feed all those expensive, hungry mouths if it does
not keep them occupied by the hour? Sadly, law finns get away with
this, except with a small, yet growing number of experienced inhouse counsel.
The other speakers who look at this might say that PL's behavior is unethical. I disagree. What we have here is a management
problem-the failure of the client to demand delivery of the service
under more rational and effective pricing schemes and the failure of
law firms to break away from the practice, one which I think they
hate as much as their clients. When businesses contract with other
service providers-usually for a lump sum-they generally look for a
reputation for quality and a commitment to achieve certain results.
The means of achieving those results are quite irrelevant, so long as
they are legal and ethical. It does not matter to the business whether
the service provider puts ten people on the job or one, or how many
photocopies they produce as part of their work product, or who flies
first class or eats in fancy restaurants. Once a price is agreed to, what
the service provider does with the money is less important than
whether it achieves the desired goal.
Whether the service provider assigns ten inefficient people to
work the matter at a small profit, or one person like Mr. Antitrust at
a fat profit would seem of no significant ethical consequence. If the
service provider fails to deliver (by not preventing, for example, a
hostile takeover or minimizing the effects of a public crisis), it is rare
that the post-mortems will include griping about the price. Just the
opposite is the case when a law firm bills hourly, for the griping is
certain to happen because of the bills that come monthly in ever
differing sizes-drip by drip, like water torture-even at the end of a
success. Hourly bills provoke the client to think that it has been taken
advantage of, that too much work has been done to increase the
firm's revenues.
Think of our issue this way. A business asks a service provider
("SP") to help on a unique problem and the SP agrees to so it, say,
for $100,000. SP then decides to put its best person on the project-alone. SP knows this person will achieve the desired results for
the client at a salary cost plus overhead of $40,000, leaving it with a
$60,000 profit. Another service provider might have managed the
service with more people and thus less profit, but in either case, it is
unlikely that anyone would question the ethics of how they accounted. How they staff the project and how much profit they want to
make is their call.
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Now let us change one of the characters. This time the business
hires a law finn to provide a similar service. Let us say that instead
of negotiating to bill by the hour, the firm agrees to the same
$100,000 lump sum price and similarly assigns its best person to
perform (e.g., Mr. Antitrust). The law firm's expense being the same
as SP's above, it too will make a $60,000 profit on the deal. Nothing
ethically wrong here, is there? So long as the same results are
achieved either way, whether the law firm makes its $60,000 profit
from a lump sum approach or hourly billing approach ought to be
ethically irrelevant to us and the client. Sure, it might seem odious
that the law firm that bills hourly could overwork the matter to build
up to the $100,000 revenue goal (deviously or clumsily), but had the
firm instead negotiated an up-front lump sum fee of $100,000 and put
six people on it versus the efficient one, because that is the way it
manages, nobody could pin it with an ethical charge. The point here
is that the way to get all of us out of these kind of tail-chasing ethical arguments is not to regulate them with endless rules and scarlet
letter punishments, but to encourage practices by law firms and clients that abandon hourly billing. In short, to cause them to manage
their relationship more efficiently, more creatively, and in keeping
with the common marketplace practices. Doing this will:
Force smarter, more efficient consideration and management of contingencies. Many contingencies in fact will go
away, because law firms will condition themselves to learn
the patterns in contingencies, and thus, how to include them
in the price in advance. Other service providers are quite
good at this; lawyers can be, too.
Cause the firm to assign the most seasoned, productive,
efficient, creative lawyers to manage the client's needs. Ideally, this will speed up delivery of the service to the client. If
adopted throughout the profession, it could help shrink the
number of lawyers in our already bloated industry. Moreover,
it will likely encourage law firms to write contracts more
clearly and efficiently, and to promote litigation less often in
favor of Alternative Dispute Resolution.
End the absurd nickel-and-dime hostilities over flying and
dining practices, photocopying, assignment of associates, and
the like. These hostilities result from hourly billing, which
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mandates constant, intensive auditing, forcing the client always to look for some evidence of chicanery.
Law firms can learn how to bill on a non-hourly basis by studying how their clients buy and sell services. It is a wonder that they
have not already learned this, considering all the contracts they negotiate and draft for service providers. Learning from clients and their
other service providers, especially how they budget with each other,
will make law firms more sensitive to the roller coaster rides they
create for their clients from bills that swing high and low, month by
month. Clients want predictability; they cannot afford constantly to
mis-forecast their budgets. From my own experience, a company more
often then not would rather achieve a forecasted loss than achieve a
gain that results from a mis-forecast.
Let me close by saying, that I do not believe that migrating
away from hourly billing by itself will end client hostility toward our
profession. Our problems go much deeper than our billing practices.
For one, many people see the problem as an overabundance of laws
and lawyers--each feeding on and causing the other to grow yearafter-year with no end in sight. New laws spring from thousands of
legislative, judicial, and administrative agency sources annually, each
one requiring some kind of role for the 800,000 members of our
profession: interpretation, notice, compliance, defense, challenge or, as
is too often the case, a return to one of those sources for clarification. The cycle of law growth and lawyer growth naturally increases
the intrusion of our profession into the lifeblood of our society and
economy. The result is that people and organizations, have to rely-at
great expense-on lawyers, more and more, just to make their way
through the maze of public life. Is it any wonder why there is resentment out there? What I have proposed today is a modest way to deal
with one significant cause of that resentment. Most of you, I am sure,
will disagree with my proposal, holding perhaps, that the solution to
gross lawyer profits is for still more tinkering, more ethical rules, and
prosecutions of lawyers who bill in ways we do not like. You are
wrong.
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